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ARTICLE
RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
ON CUSTODIAL PARENTS: SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION?
By

t

ALIX GRAVENSTEIN PASTIS*

INTRODUCTION

Residence restrictions are frequently imposed on the custodial, but not the noncustodial, parent. l These restrictions come
into play when the custodial parent wishes to move with the
child, the noncustodial parent opposes the move, and a court is
called upon to resolve the dispute. 2 The court will do so based
upon a determination of what it judges to be in the best interests of the child. 3 The best interests inquiry ultimately resolves
itself into a question of whether the custodial parent's reasons
for making the move are sufficiently substantial to outweigh the
noncustodial parent's interest in existing visitation privileges.' A
custodial parent who violates the residence restrictions may lose
custody of the child,'1 forfeit child support,6 or be subjected to
*J.D., Ohio State University; B.S., Case Western Reserve University. Attorney
Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio. The author wishes to thank Professor Nancy S.
Erickson for her guidance and critical evaluation of the Article. In addition the author
acknowledges the helpful comments of Patricia Screen and Mike Pastis.
1. See infra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
4.Id.
5. See, e.g., Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D. 2d 579, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 464 (1983); Brandon
v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976);
Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283; 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973). Cf. Giachetti v.
Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (no change of custody, but injunction
restraining removal).
6. See, e.g., Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La.
168, 210 So. 2d 52 (1968); Ryan v. Ryan, 300 Minn. 244, 216 N.W.2d 912 (1974). Cf.
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contempt proceedings.7
In today's highly mobile society, residence restrictions create two forms of post-divorce inequality for women because the
custodial parent is usually the mother.8 First, there is a disparate impact on women because only the custodial parent is burdened with residence restrictions. The noncustodial parent, usually the father, remains free to relocate at will. Second, the socalled "best interests" standard permits the court to interject
personal values that are frequently sex-biased, into the decision
to permit or deny relocation. Yet even assuming that residence
restrictions are grounded in sex-neutral justifications, they have
a disparate impact on women that reinforces a traditional sexbased hierarchy; they effectively grant the noncustodial father
the power to veto a proposed move unless the custodial mother
can show "substantial" reasons to legitimate her decision to
move.
Residence restrictions are disturbing not only because of the
potential for sex discrimination, but also because of the harm
they entail for all involved. Custodial mothers are often able to
fulfill their desire to move to join a new husband 9 or accept a
new job10 only at the risk of losing custody of their child. The .
personal, emotional, or economic harm to the custodial mother
may not always be obvious. She may simply forego an opportuD'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 144 N.J.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976) (move allowed but child support reduced).
7. See, e.g., Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La.
168, 210 So. 2d 52 (1968); Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380, 401 N.Y.S.2d 213
(1978).
8. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980).
9. See In re Marriage of Smith, 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981); Giachetti v.
Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (where permission to move was denied). But see Martinez v. Konczweski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1981), aff'd, 57
N.Y.2d 809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 455 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982); Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d
395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 168, 210 So. 2d 52 (1968) (where permission to
move was granted).
10. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 "A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d.413 (1981), aff'd, 55
N.Y.2d 997, 434 N.E.2d 708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982); Weiss v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 428
N.Y.S.2d 506 (1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981)
(where the move was denied). C/. Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d
828 (App. Div. 1984); Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972) (mother
obtained gainful employment 140 miles from her former husband's home). But see Jafari
v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284 N.W.2d 554 (1979); Tandy v. Tandy, 42 lli. App. 3d 87, 355
N.E.2d 585 (1976) (where the trial court gave permission to move and was affirmed on
appeal).
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nity that requires relocation under the belief that a residence
restriction requires it; she may bargain away the noncustodial
parent's financial obligations such as child support to avoid litigation or the effect of an adverse decision after trial.
The potential for harm does not end with the state's intervention into the custodial mother's personal decision making.
Men, particularly noncustodial fathers, can also be harmed. A
noncustodial father's contact with his child could be permanently denied or crippled because a custodial mother faced with
limited, high-cost options might secretly move and conceal the
child's whereabouts to circumvent the restriction. Men are also
harmed when they marry women with children from a prior
marriage. Such men may be faced with two unpalatable options:
foregoing a relationship with a woman burdened by a residence
restriction or assuming the burden themselves. Finally, if current residence restriction analysis is applied to custodial fathers
on an equal basis they could obviously be harmed in the same
way as custodial mothers.
Of course, the ultimate loser in a dispute of this nature is
the child of the divorced couple. He or she could not be left unscathed by a parental dispute that rises to the level of requiring
judicial intervention or circumvention of the legal process.
This Article will generally refer to the custodial parent as
"mother" and the noncustodial parent as "father" because that
describes the typical alignment of the parties and highlights the
sex discrimination issues. The term "child" will be used regardless of how many children are involved because the analysis does
not turn on the number of children. This Article will demonstrate that residence restrictions are not consistent with concepts of custody and general rules on change of custody. And, it
will show that residence restrictions are sex-based in their application, justification, and effect because they exist to protect only
the interests of the noncustodial father. If most custodial parents were men, residence restrictions would cease to exist or
would be analyzed differently; the focus would finally be on the
real interests at stake for all involved.
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II. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND THEIR OPERATION

A.

NATURE AND SOURCE OF RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS

Restrictions on relocation of the mother can be, imposed by
statute,!1 a separation agreement/2 a divorce decree,!3 or in a
post-divorce proceeding. A post-divorce proceeding may take
one of several forms: a petition for modification of the decree to
prohibit removal,14 a request for injunctive relief to restrain relocation to protect visitation privileges in the divorce decree,15 a
petition for change of custody under the theory that the move is
a "change of circumstances" warranting such an extreme measure/ 6 or a combination of these devicesP These are often initiated by the mother's petition for removal18 or for modification of
the residence restriction or visitation privilege. 19 Such restrictions may prohibit the mother from making an intrastate20 or an
11. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.175(3)(1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:2-2 (West 1976).
12. Restrictions may be negotiated in a settlement agreement. Because their interpretation is governed in part by questions of merger and contract law, relocation decisions based on an interpretation of such agreements are beyond the scope of this Article.
13. See, e.g., Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319, 326 N.W.2d 497 (1982);
Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984). Accord Jafari
v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284 N.W.2d 554 (1979) (restrictions imposed in decree of
dissolution).
'
14. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978).
15. See, e.g., Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977); Weiss v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 428 N.Y.S.2d 506
(1980), aft'd, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Gunter v. Gunter, 93 m. App. 3d 1043, 418 N.E.2d 149 (1981); In re
Marriage of Smith, 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981).
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage, of Martinis, 51 Or. App. 861, 627 P.2d 504 (1981) (motion for change of custody or restraining order); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d
822 (Iowa 1978) (petition for change of custody or residence restrictions).
18. See, e.g., Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82 (N.D. 1981); Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85
Ill. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336
So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978).
20. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Lebowitz, 403 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)(trial court
decision restricting residence to local county in divorce decree was reversed as abuse of
discretion and modified to restrict residence to state); Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App.
485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972) (trial court granted father's motion to prohibit relocation within
state but 140 miles from father's home); Cheatham v. Cheatham, 344 So. 2d 525 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977) (restriction of residence to 50-mile radius unreasonable); Groh v. Groh,
110 Wis. 2d 117, 327 N.W.2d 655 (1983) (court lacked power to make order requiring
mother to relocate 235 miles within state); Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220,
476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984) (error to condition continued custody on mother's return
to state and residence within a 40-mile radius of father).
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interstate21 move with the child without first obtaining permission from either the court or the father, regardless of her reasons
for wanting to move.
A mother may want or need to move in order to fulfill her
obligations to support and rear her child. 22 Her desire to move
may also be affected by other considerations that benefit the
child by furthering the mother's personal interests.23 For example, if she marries a nonresident of the jurisdiction, the couple
may decide it is in the new family's interest to live in his state
rather than in hers.24 The prospect of employment for herself,25
her new spouse,26 or her fiance 27 may motivate the proposed
move. She may wish to move closer to relatives in order to gain
assistance with the upbringing of the child, or for emotional support after divorce. 28 Her health29 or the child's30 may motivate a
desire to move. Educational opportunities may not be available
locally.31 She may view the move as necessary to establish a new
life for herself apart from her ex-husband,32 to avoid post21. See supra notes 9 & 10.
22. See, e.g., Gottschall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982); Tanttila

v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 446, 382 P.2d 798 (1963); Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis. 2d 117, 327
N.W.2d 655 (1983). See also infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text, discussing responsibilities imposed upon the custodial parent.
23. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, _, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40
(1980) (child was indirectly benefited by allowing move because custodian was happier);
In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 1976) (move would make
mother a happier person and better parent).
24. See supra note 9.
25. See supra note 10.
26. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, 431 N.E.2d 1120
(1981); Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717,445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d
809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 455 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Garland v. Garland, 19 Ill. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1974); Gottschall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982).
28. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Brown v.
Brown, 261 Iowa 591, 155 N.W.2d 426 (1968); Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 460
N.Y.S.2d 607 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973); Abraham v. Abraham, 44 A.D.2d 675, 353 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Tandy v. Tandy, 42 Ill. App. 3d 87, 355 N.E.2d 585 (1976); In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, _, 431 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (1981). But see Dozier
v. Dozier, 167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 334 P.2d 957 (1957) (move denied where child's asthma
and pneumonia attacks would be aggravated).
31. See, e.g., Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 (App.
Div. 1978); Harris v. Harris, 57 Misc. 2d 672, 293 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fam. Ct. 1968).
32. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246
N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 1976).
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divorce tensions,33 or to make a "fresh start" and establish her
authority as head of the post-divorce family unit. 34 Of course,
the motivating reason may also be a conscious intent to frustrate
visitation. 35 In contrast to the number and variety of reasons
that might individually or collectively motivate the mother's desire to move, the father's interests in resisting the move are
much more circumscribed.
At best, the father opposes relocation to protect the child
from specific harm36 or to preserve presently exercised visitation
privileges by keeping the child near the father's residence. 37 Increased distance may curtail or, in extreme circumstances, eliminate visitation because of work or economic constraints. Nonfinancial considerations, such as new marital obligations, may
also diminish the opportunity to visit over greater distances.
Qualitatively, alternative arrangements may not be comparable
to existing arrangements for nurturing a parent-child relationship. Thus, even where the mother bears part of the expense
associated with long distance visitation, existing visitation may
be diminished.
On the other hand, a father may resist relocation simply as
a matter of marginal inconvenience where, for example, he is not
currently fully exercising existing opportunities for visitation or
has, himself, previously relocated farther away.3S On an even less
benign level, he may challenge the move simply to gain bargaining leverage to reduce child support or other financial obligations,39 or to spite the mother. When the father is required to
33. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1976).
34. Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, 35
STAN. L. REV. 949, 951 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Role].
35. In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
36. See, e.g., Gunter v. Gunter, 93 TIL App. 3d 1043, 418 N.E.2d 149 (1981)
(mother's bigamous remarriage and threat of physical harm to child); Dozier v. Dozier,
167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 334 P.2d 967 (1959) (child's health).
37. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, _, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (1981)
(forty-five percent of time spent with child); Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, _, 284
N.W.2d 554, 555 (1979) (daily visits).
38. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 lli. App. 3d 341, _, 408 N.E.2d 37, 38
(1980) (after divorce, father moved to Virginia and then New York, but successfully opposed mother's move to California at the trial level); Gray v. Gray, 57 lli. App. 3d 1, _,
372 N.E.2d 909, 911-12 (1978) (father had moved intrastate and visits were reduced from
weekends to "perhaps" once a month; trial court denied permission for mother's move,
reversed on appeal).
39. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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pay child support, he may feel the quid pro quo is a right to
convenient visitation and a right to exercise some authority in a
situation where he is otherwise powerless. "The lack of authority
or clearly defined value has a particularly demeaning significance for fathers . . . . [I]t is especially hard for the outside father to be stripped of rank and command and yet be expected to
provide financial support."40
Because either a request for permission to move or a residence restriction violation frequently result in a change of custody at the father's request,41 the operation of residence restrictions will be examined and criticized in light of the burden that
this type of "traditional" restriction places on the mother's freedom to move.
B.

OPERATION OF THE "TRADITIONAL" RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS

Once a residence restriction case is brought before the court,
the court decides according to what it perceives to be in the
"best interests of the child," or, in a few jurisdictions, the "best
interests of the post-divorce custodial family unit."42 The court
exercises a breadth of discretion under either standard which is
subject to few restraints. The trial court is often not required to
make findings of fact, to write an opinion, or to reconcile the
case with precedent.43 In general, an appellate court will not reverse unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous.
Under such circumstances, the ability to determine when a court
has acted upon an inappropriate factor is necessarily limited.
Yet, many decisions are reversed on appeal because the court
used an improper burden of production44 or gave the evidence
40. Note, Judicial Role, supra note 34, at 952 n.14 (quoting M. HUNT & B. HUNT,
181-82 (1977».
41. See supra note 5.
42. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 123-30 discussing the nature of the physical and psychological interests of the child.
43. See Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication; Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 253-54 (Summer 1975).
44. See Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319, 322, 326 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1982)
(mother must meet D'Onofrio standard, not statutory "best interests" factors because
court would have to reconsider factors previously considered in awarding custody that
are likely to be inappropriate in a removal hearing). Cf. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393,
399 (Minn. 1983) (motion by the mother to relocate shall be granted unless opposing
party establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the best
interests of the child).

THE DIVORCE EXPERIENCE
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improper weight under the best interests standard.45 As will be
shown below, the reported cases demonstrate the sex-biased values that underlie a court's decision in the allocation of the burden of production and the nature of the standard of proof.
1.

Burden of Production

Courts use presumptions affecting the burden of production
to ·assist in their decisions under the best interests standard.
Some jurisdictions recognize presumptions favoring the mother's
right to move under the theory that it is generally in the best
interests of the child to remain with the custodial parent because it promotes continuity with the primary caretaker46 and
the child's sense of security.47 However laudable this presumption may appear, the advantage it affords the mother in litigation is illusory.
Because the presumption benefiting the mother is an advantage only after judicial intervention, she still must spend the
time and incur the expense of litigating the matter. In order to
meet her burden of persuasion under the best interests inquiry,
she must show a substantial reason to legitimate her move.48
Even if the court ultimately allows the move, her success may be
undercut by a reduction in child support or a requirement to
defray the father's increased costs of visitation.49 Finally, there
45. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1981) (where
mother married an out-of-state resident, it was error to deny permission to relocate);
Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 N.J.Super. 84, _, 390 A.2d 1202, 1206 (App. Div. 1978)
(where the mother sought to further her education and had made detailed arrangements
for the child, it was error to deny removal based on finding that living in Manhattan
would not be as conducive to the welfare of the child as living in a New Jersey suburb).
Ct. Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, 155 N.W. 2d 426 (1968) (where testimony related
entirely to effect move would have on the mother and did not refer to the child except to
suggest that the move would allow the mother to be "better able to do things for the
kids," it was error to permit removal).
46. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1983).
47. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983); Bernick v. Bernick,
31 Colo. App. 485, 487-88, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); Cheatham v. Cheatham, 344 So. 2d
525, 527 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
48. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Iowa 1976)
(mother found to have burden of proof and permission to move granted); In re Marriage
of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Iowa 1979) (burden of proof on mother and permission to move granted).
49. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, _, 365 A.2d 27, 33 (Ch.
Div. 1976) (child support reduced); Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 84 (N.D. 1981)
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is always the risk that the court will reject the presumption that
it is in the best interests of the child to remain with the mother,
and adopt 'the more common presumption that favors the father: 50 that frequent and regular visitation best serve the child's
interests. 51 The underlying notion reflects a preference for maintaining the status quo, "since any change would be from known
conditions proven to be conducive to the child's welfare to surroundings . . . in the nature of an experiment which should not
be made."52 The court in O'Neil v. Koch 53 was more candid in
stating the true premise as "proper to emphasize the father[child] relationship since he is the parent who stands to lose
contact with the child against his will if removal is approved. "54
This premise reflects the view that the mother should be held
responsible for the consequences of her own willful actions and
the father deserves sympathy when actions are forced upon him
against his will. Such a view, however, does not reflect the true
nature of the post-divorce interests involved. This view not only
abrogates judicial responsibility to decide what is in the best interests of the child, but also calls attention to the sex discrimination issues.
2.

Standard of Proof

In most jurisdictions, the court makes the decision about
whether or not to allow the mother to move with the child supposedly so as to promote the so-called "best interests" of the
(mother required to pay travel expenses of child to and from North Dakota for six-weeks
summer visitation); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1973)
(costs of transporting child from California to Louisiana divided equally between the
parents for eight-weeks summer visitation where mother moved to improve her wages
from $75 to $125 per week); Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844,
(1981),5 N.Y.2d 809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 445 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982) (mother required to pay
father's travel to Florida and child's travel to New York).
50. Compare Tandy v. Tandy, 42 m. App. 3d 87, 355 N.E.2d 585 (1976) (burden on
father) with Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 m. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980) (burden on
mother to show real advantage to herself and child). But compare Tanttila v. Tanttila,
152 Colo. 446, 382 P.2d 798 (1963) (burden on party seeking removal which was the
mother; regular visits presumed preferable to long visits at father's expense) with
Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972) (presumption that mother as
custodial parent made decision in attempt to meet best interest of child).
51. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 865-66 (1981).
52. Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, _, 155 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1968).
53. 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1207 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
54. [d.
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child. 55 However, the court usually does not focus on the welfare
of the child; its focus is on the competing parental "rights." The
decisions usually juxtapose the father's visitation privilege
against the mother's reasons for moving. 56 The heavy evidentiary burden that this standard places on the mother is typified
by the stringent New York "exceptional circumstances" test. 57
In New York, a mother must show a unique or firm job offer, exceptional health or educational needs, or a "dramatic"
change of locale which was necessitated by a new marriage. 58
Anything short of these exceptional needs may result in denial
of permission to move and a temporary or permanent change of
custody. 59 This burden is only marginally different from the burden imposed in New Jersey under D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,60 a
decision which is gaining acceptance in a number of
jurisdictions.61
55. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 572 (1968).
56. See Comment, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights,
27 DE PAUL L. REV. 113, 118 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Deprivation of
Rights}. The "best interests" standard has been roundly criticized as giving the court no
substantive guide lines and the opportunity to disguise the real basis for decision. See,
e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); Henzey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What is the Best Interests Doctrine?, 15 J. FAM. L. 213 (1976-1977); Uviller, Father's Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978); Mnookin, supra note 43.
57. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176-77,418 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 865-66, (1981) (citing Strahl v. Strahl, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429
N.Y.S.2d 636 (1980) where the "exceptional circumstances" test was created in the context of a relocation controversy between parents who had joint custody). Because of the
different assumptions upon which joint custody is based, joint custody relocation controversies are not considered in this Article, nor should they have any controlling influence
in context of traditional custody.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (1981) (temporary custody given father until mother relocated to New York where prescribed visitation
could be carried out; mother's showing of limited employment in her field in the local
area and a job already obtained out of state was not an exceptional circumstance which
could sustain petition to have limited support increased); Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D.2d
579, _, 459 N.Y.S.2d 464, 464 (1983) (transfer of custody to father, inability to find
suitable employment in New York and opportunity to build better life in California because of a better job offer there were not a compelling showing of exceptional
circumstances).
60. 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d
716 (App. Div. 1976).
61. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983) (D'Onofrio approved,
but burden of persuasion on noncustodial parent); Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319,
323, 326 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1982) (D'Onofrio standard adopted); Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85
ill. App. 3d 1090, _, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950 (1980) (D'Onofrio followed); Burich v. Burich,
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The D'Onofrio standard requires the mother to show that
the move will provide a "real advantage" to the new family unit:
herself and the child. 62 In applying the standard, the court must
consider four determinative factors: (1) whether. there is a
"likely capacity" that the move will improve the quality of life
for both the mother and the child; (2) whether the mother's primary motive in moving is to frustrate visitation; (3) whether the
father is resisting the move in order to decrease existing support
obligations; and (4) whether adequate visitation alternatives exist and whether the mother will comply with them. 63
The facts of D'Onofrio cast doubt on the real importance of
evaluating the individual factors. For example, the court recognized that the father had not fully exercised his visitation privileges, in spite of the mother's encouragement, and that he had
no objection to the move, provided that the mother was willing
to forego the weekly child support of forty dollars for two children. In spite of his visitation record and admitted self-serving
motive in resisting the move, the court allowed the move but
reduced the child support by fifteen dollars to enable the father
to pay for transportation for visitation. 64 This clearly undercut
any "real advantage" to the new family unit. Reduction of child
support, in order to enable visitation, reflects a value preference
for the father's potential interests even above the child's needs.
Thus, the D'Onofrio "real advantage" test under the best interests inquiry is ultimately no more predictable or value-neutral
than similar analyses in jurisdictions that have not adopted any
"test."

.

On the positive side, the D'Onofrio test clarifies what the
court is balancing under the "best interests of the child" standard and it specifically requires the court to consider at least
one of the less benign motives for resisting the move. On the
other hand, it enlarges the "best interests" inquiry because it
appears to permit the court to deny a move that apparently is
not in the mother's best interests.
In short, both the New York and New Jersey tests exem314 N.W.2d 82, 84 (N.D. 1981) "(cited D'Onofrio with approval).
62. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, _, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976).
63. [d.
64. [d. at _, 365 A.2d at 32-33.
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plify the difficult standard of proof that the mother must meet
in order to avoid a loss of custody. Both the allocation of the
burden of production and the application of the illusory "best
interests" standard in "traditional" residence restriction analysis
admit value preferences that may not be sex-neutral. Because of
the severe burdens that these restrictions place on the mother,
they should be abandoned unless they in fact operate and can be
justified on a sex-neutral basis.

III. CRITIQUE OF "TRADITIONAL" RESIDENCE
RESTRICTIONS
If residence restrictions are in fact geared to protect the
best interests of the child, residence restriction analysis should
comport with traditional notions of custody and rules on change
of custody; they should be applied on an equal basis to all custodial parents regardless of sex, and the state's interests in imposing and enforcing residence restrictions should be sex-neutral
and logically furthered by such restrictions. Yet, the realities of
the purposes, the actual implementation and the effect of residence restrictions are unsupported on grounds other than sex
because they are contrary to concepts of custody and general
rules on change of custody, and are sex-based in application and
justification.

. A.
1.

RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO CONCEPTS OF
CUSTODY AND GENERAL RULES ON CHANGE OF CUSTODY

Custody

When the traditional family unit has broken down, the
court awards custody of the child to the parent it deems best
qualified to protect and further the child's best interests, who is
usually the mother.6!> The custody award implicitly, if not explicitly, requires the mother to assume the prior collective responsibilities of both parents to supervise, educate, support and care
for the child. 66 She thus becomes head of the post-divorce family
unit with broad powers and responsibilities to care for and rear
65. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 573-96; J.
supra note 56, at 19.
66. See H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 573-74.

GOLDSTEIN,

A.

FREUD

& A.

SOLNIT,
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the child; the noncustodial father usually retains visitation privileges and duty to assist in the financial support of the child.67
The state ordinarily will not interfere in ongoing family decision making to impose one method of child rearing over another, except where the child is threatened with physical harm
or the legislature has fixed the state policy, such as compulsory
schoollaws. 68 This posture reflects a policy of family autonomy,
a recognition that parents require authority to carry out parental responsibilities, and a recognition that the family unit is best
able to protect the child's welfare in both the traditional and
post-divorce family.69 However, these principles of family autonomy evaporate in the context of residence restrictions.
When the traditional family unit is intact, the state will not
question a family decision to relocate because implicitly the
child's interests are adequately protected by the family. The
same result should obtain when the post-divorce family decides
to move because the award of custody creates a new family unit
necessarily predicated upon the mother's ability to protect the
best interests of the child; principles of custody and family autonomy are contrary to the imposition of residence restrictions.
There is no greater need for the court to substitute its judgment
of what will serve the best interests of the child in the postdivorce family unit than in the traditional family setting.
The court won't second guess a post-divorce family's decision to move locally although the move may equally impair the
child's interests by necessitating a change in schools or the like.
Challenges to intrastate moves are rarely successful.70 Where an
interstate move is permitted, the mother has implicitly provided
adequate protection of the child's welfare.71 Thus, there is no
good reason to believe that she can not protect the child in all
relocation situations. Judicial intervention on the child's behalf
is simply contrary to the basic concept of custody.
67. ld.
68. ld. at 574-76.
69. ld.
70. See supra note 20.
71. See Appendix for a sampling of case dispositions from various jurisdictions on
the issue of removal.
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Because state intrusion into the post-divorce family unit's
decision to move is inconsistent with accepted notions of custody and family autonomy, it is inexplicable on grounds other
than sex. Moving restrictions are imposed and enforced only at
the behest of the father; that is, only if he feels either that his
ability to judge what is in the best interests of the child is superior to the mother's, or that his interests in visitation are superior to the mother's interests in moving. When the court intrudes under either proposition, it implicitly rejects the rationale
of the custody decision and gives judicial approval to the continued subordination of women, unless the circumstances would
otherwise meet the requirements for a change of custody.
2.

Change of Custody

Generally when a father petitions the court for a change of
custody, he is required to show a "substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child."72 The father bears a
heavy burden of persuasion due to judicial reluctance to change
the status quo. This judicial attitude arises out of an awareness
of the inherent potential for harm to the child from a modification of custody, and a concern for the policies favoring the finality of judgments and opposing relitigation of matters already determined.73 Therefore, to comport with the normal rules on
change of custody in a residence restriction controversy, the father should have both the burden of production and the burden
of persuading the court that the mother's move is not in the best
interests of the child.
In Garland v. Garland,74 the mother wanted to move with
the child to join her fiance and obtain a new job.711 The court
rejected the father's petition for change of custody76 and his
claim of sexual bias in the allocation of the burden of proof:
[W]hile it is true that [the father] was confronted
here with a presumption of the continuing validity of the custody provisions [created by the bur72. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 598-60l.
73. ld.
74. 19 Ill. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1974).
75. Garland, 19 Ill. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811.
76. ld. at _, 312 N.E.2d at 815 (the father argued sex-bias in favor of women because the court presumed his former wife was better able to care for their child and thus
awarded her custody).
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den and standard of proof], the presumption operates to protect the welfare of the children by
preserving the status quo regardless of which parent has custody. To that extent, it is neither constitutionally prohibited nor sexually discriminatory . . . . Furthermore, although [there was
expert testimony] that the separation of the children from the father would be more traumatic
than to most children because of their apparent
closeness, we believe that the evidence indicates
both were good parents and, under such circumstances, a separation from either would be
traumatic. 77

On the other hand, in Gunter v. Gunter,78 the father was
granted a change of custody against the mother's removal petition because he proved that the mother had entered into a bigamous marriage and the child was threatened with physical harm
from the new spouse. 79 Both of these cases demonstrate how the
general rules on change of custody should operate in a residence
restriction controversy. The more common approach puts the
entire burden of proof on the mother to show that the move is in
the best interests of the child, contrary to the general rules governing changes of custody.
For example, in Courten v. Courten,80 a transfer of custody
to the father was upheld upon a finding that the mother's move
to find suitable employment was insufficient reason to justify interference with the father's visitation rights; the court deemed
the mother's efforts to find work locally "unimpressive."81 The
court found that residence with the father, with liberal visitation
by the mother, was in their four-year-old daughter's best interests. 82 The court did not discuss the general rules on change of
custody; it merely held that a disruption of the relationship between the father and the child would not be permitted absent a
77. ld., at _, 312 N.E.2d at 814. Accord Cheatham v. Cheatham, 344 So. 2d 525,
527-28 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Iowa
1976).
78. 93 TIl. App. 3d 1043, 418 N.E.2d 149 (1981).
79. ld.
80. 92 A.D.2d 579, 459 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1983).
81. ld.
82. ld.
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compelling showing of "exceptional circumstances" by the
mother.8s The court did not consider the disruption of the relationship between the mother and the child that would result
from a change of custody.
In another case, a mother argued that denial of permission
to move the child in order to join her new husband was tantamount to a change of custody order, and that the proceeding
should, therefore, be governed by the change of custody rules
that require the father to prove a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. 84 The court rejected
the mother's argument because it deemed the case to be a removal hearing controlled by the best interests standard.8!> It explained that any resulting change of custody was not caused by a
denial of permission to move the child; the mother was not
bound to follow her new husband-her decision to do so was
voluntary.86
In a similar vein, a father sought to bar his ex-wife's move
to join her second husband and relatives by petitioning for a
change of custody or a modification of the custody orders to prohibit removal. 87 The court denied the change of custody, but issued a restraining order to enjoin removal even though the father was unable to show a substantial change of circumstances.88
The court held that such a showing was not necessary where the
father was really just seeking to enforce the implicit restriction
on moving created by the visitation rights in the custody orders.89 In any event, the court observed that the mother was not
without a remedy because she could seek a modification of the
custody orders if she could satisfy the substantial change of circumstances and the best interests tests. 90
These cases are representative of the mainstream approach
to traditional residence restriction analysis. As such, they
demonstrate a departure from the factors and policies usually
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

[d.
O'Neil v. Koch, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1207 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
[d.
[d.
Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
[d. at 29.

89. [d.

90. [d. at 30.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/1

16

Pastis: Residence Restrictions

1986]

RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS

435

considered important in change of custody litigation. These departures implicate the same lack of sex-neutrality noted in the
departures from the general concepts of custody and family autonomy in residence restriction controversies: the father's postdivorce interests are superior to the mother's although she bears
the day-to-day responsibilities of custody. This observation is
further reinforced by an analysis of the hierarchy of factors that
influence the court's best interests determination.
B.

RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ARE SEx-BASED IN APPLICATION

Viewed objectively, there should be no requirement for the
court to inquire into the. mother's reasons for moving. The court
has already determined that it is in the best interest of the child
that he or she remain with the mother when it made the custody
award. It should follow that the child goes wherever the mother
goes unless the father can meet the burden of proving that a
change of custody is required. A potential impairment of visitation91 should limit the court's investigation to a determination of
what alternative visitation arrangements are feasible; it should
not open the door to a broader intrusion into the new family's
autonomy. However, the court does not confine its inquiry to alternative visitation arrangements. Instead, the mother is required to explain or justify her reasons for moving to the court.
A court is more likely to accept the reasons the mother offers for the move if they are based upon an objectively demonstrable fact such as remarriage or a new job already secured by
the mother or her new husband outside the jurisdiction.92 As her
reasons become more subjective, her likelihood of success diminishes. In such cases, the court may view her motives as unclear,
trivial,93 or spiteful94 and therefore deny the move. Regardless of
91. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 24-26.
93. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 866 (1981). "[H]owever well intentioned, [the mother's] search is for no more than
an 'opportunity.''' Id. In re Marriage of Martinis, 51 Or. App. 861, 864, 627 P.2d 504,
505 (1981) (mother had not made a formal commitment to marry her fiance, had no
personal contact with him in nine months and there was no evidence of the fiance's love
for the child); Abraham v. Abraham, 44 A.D.2d 676, 353 N.Y.S.2d 796 (health justification "vague"); Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, _, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1981).
"[M]ere whim or even desire of the custodial parent to seek a new life is not sufficient."
Id. Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, _, 155 N.W.2d 426, 427 (1968)(move motivated by
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what reasons the mother may submit, the courts are largely inconsistent as to what facts will justify relocation. A sampling of
dispositions within different jurisdictions at the trial and appellate levels is provided in the Appendix. These cases illustrate
how arbitrary and sex-biased residence restrictions are when applied to specific controversies.
When the court permits a move, it develops alternative visitation provisions for the father.95 However, when a court denies
the move, it frequently fails to mention the visitation alternatives or summarily dismisses them as inadequate.96 This approach underscores the fact that a father can resist a move successfully when the mother's reasons for relocating are deemed
insubstantial or devalued, regardless of how insubstantial his
reasons are for resisting the move.
The sex-based values that influence the court in the application of residence restrictions are also illustrated by considering
how such restrictions operate when a custodial father is the burdened party. In Bennett v. Bennett,97 the custodial father petitioned the court for permission to move with the child to pursue
an out-of-state employment opportunity.98 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin affirmed the trial court's decision allowing the father to move and denying the mother's cross-petition for a
change of custody.99 His reason for moving was deemed sufficient; the court decided it was wiser to have the child remain
distaste for local life, "story" of what awaited mother on move to join her mother "uncertain and indefinite").
94. See, e.g., Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D.2d 579, 459 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1983) (likely
that move was motivated by presence of fiance in California and intention to deprive
father of access to child as evidenced by failure to bring child to New York for visit
during trial); In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(move occasioned by "pique," not health or welfare of children and desire to punish
father for remarrying shortly after divorce by precluding visitation).
95. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1981) (no discussion
of visitation alternatives); Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977) (no discussion of visitation alternatives); Weiss
v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981) (alternative visitation,
whether voluntarily offered or judicially imposed does not necessarily meet the needs of
the child or the father); Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (removal would make continued relationship with child "impossible").
97. 228 Wis. 401, 280 N.W. 363 (1938).
98. Id. at _, 280 N.W. at 364.
99. Id.
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with the father since alternative visitation arrangements were
possible. loo This decision is notable only when compared with
the same court's decision in Fritschler v. Fritschler,IOI a later
case involving a custodial mother.
In Fritschler, the major issue on appeal was whether the
trial court had abused its discretion by denying the custodial
mother's move and disregarding the recommendations of three
family specialists l02 who supported the mother's move from Wisconsin to Colorado.
Mrs. Fritschler's reasons for moving to Colorado
were considered insufficient by the trial court.
Reasons cited for her move were to escape from
social embarrassment from her husband's reputation as a criminal law attorney, to take advantage
of what she considered to be better job opportunities in the area of real estate sales, and better recreational facilities for the children, to help relieve
her arthritis and sinus problems, and lastly, to
make it on her own in new surroundings without
any help or hindrance from her former
husband. 103

The court stated that in Bennett, permission to move was
premised on the theory "that what was better for the father,
who was under a duty to provide support, indirectly benefited
the children."104 The court found "no such benefits" in Mrs.
Fritschler's reasons and upheld the decision of the trial court. lOIS
There was no discussion of why the move was not "better" for
her, nor of her duty to support and rear the child that the custody award had imposed. If the decision was founded on the sexbased common law rule that only the father is liable for support,
the decision cannot be upheld after Orr v. Orrl06 and Stanton v.
100. [d. Permission to move was conditioned on the father's paying all costs of the
mother's move to New York, if she so desired; alternatively, the father would pay all
costs of two-months summer visitation in Wisconsin. This is not surprising considering
the state of interstate transportation in 1938.
101. 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973).
102. [d. at _, 208 N.W.2d at 338.
103. [d.
104. [d. at _, 208 N.W.2d at 339.
105. [d.

106. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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Stanton. 107
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin also reconciled its interim
decision in Whitman v. Whitman 108 on the law of the case,
which held that removal for a proper purpose and beneficial to
the parent may be permitted if not detrimental to the children. 109 The Fritschler court emphasized language in Whitman
which indicated that custody necessarily implied some loss of
freedom to relocate. 11o However, the facts of Whitman are irreconcilable with this reading, since the mother there was allowed
to move when her only reason was to be closer to her parents. 111
Although Bennett reconciles neatly with Whitman with no
explicit sex-bias, Fritschler is blatantly sex-based, and much
more typical of the narrow view the courts take when a mother
seeks to relocate. Bennett illustrates the focus of the court's
analysis when the custodial parent is the father. In a random
review of over one hundred fifty residence restriction cases, only
one other case involved a custodial father's removal petition.
In In re Marriage of Gautier,112 the custodial father had secured employment in California after unsuccessfully seeking local work in Oregon. 113 The trial court rejected his argument that
the mother's interests in visitation could be accomplished if she
moved to California. The court conditioned continued custody in
the father on his return to Oregon from California.1l4 The court
of appeals reversed, noting that "[t]he effect of the trial court's
order is to require him to quit his job and move back to [Oregon] or lose custody of the [child]."1l6
This decision is remarkable in that it considered the effect
of the trial court's orders on the party burdened with custodial
responsibilities. It was, however, a predictable deviation in view
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
(1982).
113.
114.
115.
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•
28 Wis. 2d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965).
Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965).
Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d at _',208 N.W.2d at 339.
Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d at 50, 135 N.W.2d at 835.
58 Or. App. 510, 648 P.2d 1308, petition denied, 293 Or. _, 653 P.2d 998

Gautier, 58 Or. App. at _, 648 P.2d at 1309.
ld.
ld. at _, 648 P.2d at 1310.
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of the general concern of protecting the father's interests,
whether or not he is the custodial parent. Gautier demonstrates
how residence restrictions would operate differently if the majority of custodial parents were men. It also supports the corollary proposition that such restrictions would probably cease to
exist if most custodial parents were men.
The decision in Gautier is all the more significant because
of the absence of any mention of In re Marriage of Smith,us In
Smith, the Supreme Court of Oregon deferred to the trial court's
decision, which conditioned the mother's continued custody on
her return to Oregon from California. 117 The mother had married a long-time California resident under the mistaken belief
that her former husband would not oppose her move to California with the children. lls The appellate dispositions in Smith and
Gautier preferred the father's economic interests to the mother's
"personal" interests. There was simply no mention of the effect
of the trial court's order on the mother.
In short, the substantial reasons to legitimate a move under
current residence restriction analysis depend on gender and fluctuate with the value preferences of the court. The overriding
concern in imposing and enforcing residence restrictions stems
from a preoccupation with the potential effects of the move on
the father's interests, irrespective of the cost to the mother.
There is, therefore, good reason to be concerned about the
breadth of discretion which courts exercise in residence restriction controversies. Because these restrictions operate to
subordinate a mother's post-divorce interests and opportunities
to the father's, they should not, absent a compelling justification, be tolerated in today's mobile and supposedly egalitarian
society,11e
116. 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981).
117. Smith, 290 Or. at _,624 P.2d at 115.
118. [d.
119. Some commentators question the constitutionality of residence restrictions on
the custodial parent's right to travel. See Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial
Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341 (1981); Bodenheimer,
Equal Rights, Visitation and the Right to Move, FAM. Anvoc. 18 (1978); Note, Restrictions on a Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional
Questions, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 181 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Travel]. See
also Comment, Deprivation of Rights, supra note 56 (discussing also the right to free
association and privacy).
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RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ARE SEx-BASED IN JUSTIFICATION
AND EFFECT

Residence restrictions are usually justified as necessary to
protect the child from harm or, more directly, to preserve visitation. 120 Close analysis, however, reveals that residence restraints
are not logically tailored to meet the visitation concern and that
concern can be met by alternative visitation provisions. Nor does
protection of the child require residence restrictions, since that
interest is adequately protected by the mother in her role as custodial parent and by the existing rules governing changes of custody. Because the burdens are carried predominately, if not exclusively, by women, the continued existence of residence
restrictions is unexplainable on grounds other than sex.
1.

Protecting the Child

The parens patriae doctrine has long been recognized to be
part of the equity jurisdiction of the courts. l21 Under this doctrine, the state is justified in intervening in family decisionmaking to protect the best interests of the child in matters affecting
the child's health, education and development. 122 In the context
120. Traditionally, residence restrictions were imposed and defended to enforce the
provisions of the home state's custody decree or to discourage forum shopping in post
divorce matters. Note, Right to Travel, supra note 119, at 351-57. This justification is
undercut today by the federal enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980 and the adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 44 states. Id. at
353-57. Implicitly, courts recognize the lack of any continued vitality in this rationale for
it is barely mentioned, and given short shrift when noted at all. Compare Auge v. Auge,
334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983) (related concerns addressed by the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980) with
Girvin v. Girvin, 471 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (although a joint custody
relocation controversy, the rationale is equally applicable to traditional custody cases:
enforcement difficulties are not insuperable where nonresidence is in the best interests of
the child). In addition, as early as 1938, the court in Bennett v. Bennett, 228 Wis. _,
280 N.W. 364 (1938), recognized the inherent weakness of justifying residence restrictions on the ground that they were necessary to protect the home state's custody decree,
where the parents, principles of comity, and the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution could be relied upon to furnish assistance in the recognition of the
home state's orders in other states. Id. Because the home state decree protection rationale was not relied upon as a basis of decision in any of the cases reviewed, and in the
light of the aforementioned weaknesses in the rationale, it is not further discussed in this
Article.
121. See H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 572.
122. See generally Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and
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of imposing or enforcing residence restrictions, the court is compelled to act in defense of the child's best interests because
these interests are viewed as inadequately represented by counsel for the disputing parties. 123 This premise contradicts the implication that the court has already found that the mother is
capable of adequately protecting the child's best interests when
it made the custody award. 124
The child involved in the relocation controversy has a multitude of physical and emotional interests at stake. These include the subjective and objective quality of the home/ 25
school,126 recreational facilities,127 childcare availability,128
friends,129 church,130 and overall community environment of the
old home as compared to the proposed new residence. Due to
the subjective component implicit in any comparison, what is
"best" for the child's physical interests is largely indeterminate
and must be based upon the decision-maker's values.
Few would dispute that the child has emotional interests in
the continuity and stability of his or her relationship with both
the father and mother.131 The child also has an interest in having a happy, well-adjusted custodial parent since "the fact remains that ordinarily the day-to-day routine of the [child] ...
and the quality of [his or her] environment and general style of
life is that which is provided by the [mother] and which are,
indeed, [her] obligation to provide."132 In the relocation context,
these two psychological interests appear to be at odds.
Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1390-92 (1974).
123.Id.
124. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Knoblauch v. Jones, 613 S.W. 2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Helentjaris
v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984).
126. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372 N.E.2d 909 (1978); Middlekauff v.
Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 (App. Div. 1978).
127. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973);
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div. 1976).
128. See, e.g., Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 m. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980); In re
Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
129. See In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 m. App. 3d 666, 431 N.E.2d 1120 (1981).
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978); Gottschall v.
Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982).
131. See generally Mnookin, supra note 43, at 265; J. GOLDSTEIN. A FREUD. & A
SOLNIT. supra note 56, at 31-35.
132. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at _, 365 A.2d at 29.
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If the relocation is permitted, the continuity of the relationship with the father may be impaired. 133 However, if the move
results in a change of custody to the father, the continuity of the
relationship with the mother will definitely be impaired. 134 To
the extent that the related trauma can be viewed qualitatively,
the continuity interest would favor continued custody in the
mother, who has had the daily care of the child. Similarly, if the
move is denied and the mother foregoes the move in order to
avoid a loss of custody, the child's interest in having a happy
mother may be impaired. Both the continuity interest and the
"happy parent" interest thus appear to militate against any residence restraints.

Ultimately both the child's physical and psychological interests are indeterminate due to a lack of value consensus over
whether geographic continuity and stability is more important
than continuity with the custodial parent, and the inability to
predict the consequences on the child of allowing or denying relocation.135 If the child's interests point in any direction, they
appear to favor the mother's freedom to move. This comports
with the policies and principles underlying the general rules on
change of custody and the need to give the mother the freedom
to fulfill the responsibilities imposed by the award of custody.136
To the extent that the child's interests are indeterminate, the
court lacks the competence to make a value and sex-neutral decision in the child's best interests. Therefore, a policy of deference to the mother's decisionmaking ability is more rationally
related to the state's interest in protecting the child.

2.

Preserving Visitation Rights

Residence restrictions are frequently justified as necessary
to preserve the mutual visitation rights of the father and
133. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
135. See Mnookin, supra note 43, at 255-68, where the author makes a very convincing argument as to the innate indeterminacy of the best interests standard. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A . FREUD & A SOLNIT, supra note 56, at 51-52, where the authors
argue that the law will not act in the child's best interests, but add to the uncertainties
when it tries to predict the future.
136. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
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child. 137 However, this justification expressly subordinates 'the
mother's interests and is fraught with contradictions that undercut any surface logic.
If residence restrictions were truly designed to further the
child's interest in developing a strong relationship with the father, residence restrictions would look and operate differently.
For example, the child, or the mother on behalf of the child, or
the court would be able to compel the father's visitation and to
impose local residence restrictions on him to ensure convenient
visitation-an awkward and improbable system. In fact, under
the current approach, even a father who has relocated and does
not fully exercise visitation rights may still bar a move by the
mother with the child. 13B

In D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,139 the court observed:
[A] noncustodial parent is perfectly free to remove himself from [the] jurisdiction despite the
continued residency here of his children in order
to seek opportunities for a better or different
lifestyle for himself. And if he does choose to do
so, the custodial parent could hardly hope to restrain him from leaving [the] State on the ground
that his removal will either deprive the children
of the paternal relationship or depreciate its qual137. See H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 590. There is disagreement among the courts
whether visitation is a right of the parent, the child or a joint right of the parent and the
child. See, e.g., In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 985, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct.
1962) (natural right of father); Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176,418 N.E.2d 377,-.
436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981) (visitation is a joint right of the noncustodial parent and of
the child); Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972) ("...
primarily a right of the [child] and secondarily a right of the noncustodial parent"); In re
Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (derivative from and subservient to
the best interests of the child). Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNlT, supra note 56, at
121. Visitation rights imposed by court order merely shift the power to deprive the child
of his "basic right" to see his father from the mother to the father. Therefore, the authors argue that visitation privileges are themselves a source of discontinuity aiid the
father should have no legally enforceable right to visit the child. The authors argue,
further, that the mother, not the court, must decide how to parent the child as the court
lacks competence to be a "super-parent." Court intervention undermines the mother's
authority and capacity to parent. Id. The latter position has been extremely controversial. See generally Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond
the Best Interests of the C~ild, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979).
138. See supra note 38.
139. 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 4.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aft'd, 144 N.J. 352, 365 A.2d 716
(App. Div. 1976).
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ity. The custodial parent, who bears the essential
burden and responsibility for the children is
clearly entitled to the same option to seek a better life for herself and the children. 14o

This observation disposes of any contention that the visitation
rationale is designed to further the interests of the child's relationship with the father. It also highlights the court's hierarchy
of values insofar as the father is free to seek a better or different
lifestyle, while the mother may only seek a "better" life for the
family unit. 141
Because residence restrictions are not designed to protect
the child's interests in visitation, their objective must be to protect the father's interests in visitation. The visitation "right"
that is purportedly protected under this rationale is generally
awarded to the father upon divorce under the theory that a parent has a right to see his child, except where it is inimical to the
welfare of the child. 142 This right consists of the limited right to
visit with the child at specified times. It does not include the
right to make decisions affecting the child's needs or welfare beyond the specified visitation period, because such rights and responsibilities belong to the mother under the custody award. 143
Residence restrictions place an irrational and arbitrary burden
on the mother's freedom in light of the nature of the limited
visitation right, the fact that local restrictions are rarely enforced,144 and the fact that adequate alternative visitation can be
arranged.
When a mother moves without legal opposition from the father, presumably the parents have negotiated satisfactory alternative arrangements for visitation without the need for judicial
input. Depending on the parties' circumstances and the size of
the state in which they reside, quantitative and qualitative hardships in a permissible intrastate move are indistinguishable from
a potentially prohibited interstate relocation. In addition, the
court may devise an alternative visitation schedule if it deems
the mother's reasons for moving substantial.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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Alternative visitation may consist of longer, but less frequent, visitation intervals: for instance, six-weeks summer visitation and alternate Christmas holidays at the father's home;1415
two-weeks summer vacation, one week at Christmas and one
week in the spring at the father's home with liberal visitation
when the father is in the child's neighborhood. 146 At least one
court has speculated that such an alternative schedule, giving
the father constant and exclusive parental contact with the
child, may better serve the paternal relationship than the typical
visitation of shorter, more frequent visits.147
In Helentjaris v. Sudano,148 the mother who had moved to
Ohio from northern New Jersey to be closer to relatives who
could assist her with her infant daughter and to obtain more
flexible working hours, appealed certain provisions of the divorce decree. 149 The court reversed those provisions which conditioned her right to continued custody on her return to within a
forty mile radius of the father's home in New Jersey. The court
noted that the father could relocate-an obvious, but rarely
mentioned, alternative.
[T]he father could himself relocate to Ohio. It is
obviously no more difficult for him to do so than
for the mother to return to New Jersey. The
court's assumption or'the ability to pursue a professional career in another state applies equally to
both litigants. [The mother] is, moreover, no less
alien to New Jersey than the father would be to
Ohio, and there is no greater reason for her to
give up the comfort of her family and a satisfactory professional situation than it would be for
him to do so. If either is to sacrifice in this respect, there is indeed less reason to demand the
sacrifice to be made by the [mother] since it is
she, in the end, who must arrange her life in a
manner consistent with the day-to-day burdens of
simultaneously raising a child and pursuing a
career.IIlO
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 83·84 (N.D. 1981).
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at - . 365 A.2d at 32-33.
[d. at _, 365 A.2d at 30.
194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984).
Helentjaris, 194 Super. at 220, 476 A.2d at 828.
[d. at _, 476 A.2d at 832.
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The court's approach mirrored an earlier decision by the
same court in Middlekauff v. Middlekauff. 151 That decision reversed the trial court's denial of permission to the mother to
move from Newark to Manhattan to pursue graduate studies.152
The court recognized that the father was capable of maintaining
visitation without judicial intervention, and observed that the
additional visitation burden on the father was a forty-five minute drive each weekend, but that "he could hardly complain of
having to drive to Manhattan on weekends while expecting her
to do so several times each week."l53
As suggested by the foregoing opinions, when the mother is
permitted to move, the parties can find alternative methods of
accommodating visitation. Thence, residence restrictions are not
necessary to protect the father's visitation interest. The visitation rationale is also stripped of its logic in light of the fact that
courts only explore visitation alternatives after they have decided that the mother's reasons for moving are substantial.154
Logically, if the primary purpose for enforcing residence restrictions were to protect the father's visitation rights, it would start
and end with a formulation of substitute visitation arrangements.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Reforms are required in the statutory and decisional law in
order to curb sex discrimination, to preserve parental and personal autonomy, and to protect the children of divorced parents.
The starting point should be that the law impose no residence
restrictions on the post-divorce family unit. The parties should,
however, remain free to negotiate reciprocal residence restrictions, provided certain procedural safeguards are followed. The
court's function would thus be properly limited to modifying existing visitation schedules and enforcing privately negotiated
agreements. To implement this proposal, state legislatures
should repeal statutes requiring court permission or consent of
the noncustodial parent to relocate 155 and the following policies
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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should be adopted. 156
First, statutes governing traditional custody awards should
be amended to specifically preclude application in a relocation
controversy to ensure that courts do not embark on a renewed
"best interests" inquiry that is appropriate only to the initial
custody award. 157 Such an amendment should serve to emphasize that the court has already chosen the custodial parent best
qualified to protect the welfare of the child. It would underscore
the fact that a proposed move does not, by itself, justify relitigation of this matter. It should make clear that the court's duty in
a relocation controversy is limited to determining alternative
visitation arrangements when the parties are unable to agree on
these matters without court intervention, without regard to the
custodial parent's reasons for moving.
Second, statutes governing change of custody litigation
should be amended to state specifically that relocation, without
more, is not a "substantial change of circumstances" meriting a
change of custody. This amendment is aimed at correcting current analysis in many jurisdictions that erroneously places the
burden of proof on the custodial parent seeking relocation over a
change of custody petition. 158 It underscores the fact that the
heavy burdens of proof imposed in general change of custody
litigation are designed to protect the status quo of existing custody arrangements and not existing visitation arrangements.
The burden of proof should remain on the parent requesting a
change of custody. Further, it should explicitly bar a change of
custody based on necessary changes in visitation unless the-noncustodial parent bears the burden of showing specific harm to
the child resulting from the move. 159
Third, a court should, upon motion by either party, modify
existing visitation schedules to accommodate the parties'
changes in proximity. The court may require the parties to share
increased costs of visitation proportionate to their ability to do
156. Some of the proposals in this Article agree with suggestions made by a student
commentator in Note, Judicial Role, supra note 34, at 967-73. However, they differ significantly in perspective and in the degree of restraint proposed.
157. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
159. See Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 399 (Minn. 1983). See also supra note 47.
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so. The court should not, however, reduce child support or other
economic obligations of the noncustodial parent to the custodial
parent. Although a move may necessitate a change in visitation
arrangements, it does not follow that the move reduces the
child's needs for economic support, or the noncustodial parent's
duty to provide an aliquot share. 160 To reduce financial obligations would penalize the custodial parent for exercising the freedom to relocate. This policy should serve to eliminate the risk of
a noncustodial parent seeking alternative visitation privileges
merely to gain an economic advantage. 161
Fourth, a court should not allow the parties to impose residence restrictions by agreement unless such restrictions are
based upon a reciprocal agreement where both parties reasonably limit their freedom to move. To be enforceable, the agreement must provide for arbitration of disputes with a pre-determined, mutually approved, arbitrator under general principles of
arbitration. Further, the agreement must be separately signed by
both parties in the presence of independent counsel and with
full disclosure with respect to the dangers of such mutually obligatory restraints.
Moreover, judicial responsibility to protect the child is not
abrogated by honoring such mutual agreements because the
court is merely respecting the custodial parent's duty and ability
to make decisions in the child's best interests. The custodial
parent's decision to assume a residence restraint on equal footing with the noncustodial parent is a reflection of both parents'
concepts of what best protects the child's interests. In any event,
the court is free to disallow "unreasonable" agreements at the
inception. As a practical matter, the explicit safeguards imposed
make it unlikely that many parents would enter into such a burdensome agreement unless they were on exceptionally good
terms after the divorce. Finally, the arbitration requirement is
necessary to ensure that the court's involvement in such postdivorce matters is limited to respecting the wishes of the parties.
Although these proposals may appear radical, they comport
with traditional principles of custody and family autonomy
160. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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while eliminating the potential for harmful sex-based application. They merely ratify and approve a sex-neutral basis for
allowing relocation while protecting visitation and minimizing
socially and individually expensive litigation.
The proposals place no greater burden on the disappointed
father who may lose under current principles of residence
restrictions after costly litigation. They ensure that a mother,
under threat of litigation, does not bargain away child support
or other financial obligations in exchange for the "right" to move
away and still retain custody. The proposals provide the private
resolution of relocation issues. In addition, they further notions
of judicial economy insofar as the level and nature of inquiry is
limited to the issue of rearranging visitation or enforcing an
arbitrator's award. Finally, they serve to decrease the burdens
borne by a mother who wishes "to keep her children whose care
she has so disproportionately assumed, especially where society
continues to discriminate against her in all other areas."l62
At least one court has recognized that these changes are
necessary and appropriate:
Were we writing on a clean slate, we could logically hold that the court is authorized . . . to
award custody to a parent; that custody includes
the authority to make parental decisions such as
choice of residence; that there is no authority for
the court to substitute its parental judgment in
the form of conditions imposed upon custody; and
that the court, after making an award, should get
out of the litigants' lives unless continuation of
the status quo would be injurious to the child and
custody must be modified to avoid the injury
163

v.

CONCLUSION

Residence restrictions are frequently imposed on custodial
162. Uviller, supra note 56, at 109.
163. Meier v. Meier, 36 Or. App. 685, 688, 585 P.2d 713, 715 (1978), rev'd, 286 Or.
437,595 P.2d 474 (1979). This Article did not discuss this case in text because it involved
a proposed move to Canada and restrictions with respect to foreign countries involve
considerations not within the scope of this discussion.
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parents, but not on noncustodial parents. They have a disparate
impact on women because the custodial parent is usually the
mother.
Residence restrictions analysis implicates a lack of sex-neutrality because it is contrary to traditional concepts of custody,
rules of change of custody, and cannot therefore be justified any
other way. The father's interests are balanced against the
mother's under the guise of the "best interests of the child"
standard. However, the balance is tipped in favor of the father
because the mother's real interests are devalued or simply not
added into the balance. The courts have focused on the custodial parent's real interests only when they are confronted with a
custodial father.
The state's interest in protecting the child by placing the
burden of residence restrictions on the custodial parent is frustrated because there is no consensus that a move will impair the
child's interests. The court has already determined by the original custody award that the custodial parent is best able to protect the child's interests. There is no demonstrable, sex-neutral
reason why a move should require relitigation of that issue.
The state cannot justify residence restrictions on the custodial parent by asserting the noncustodial parent's visitation interest. This rationale is explicitly sex-based because it favors the
father's post-divorce interests. It is also unnecessary because the
noncustodial parent's limited visitation interest can usually be
adequately accommodated by alternative visitation
arrangements.
The state's intervention is not logically related to protecting
the child or the visitation interest of a noncustodial parent; residence restrictions admit a sex-based justification with respect to
a preference for freedom of movement for fathers and not for
mothers. An analysis of the reported cases demonstrates that
residence restrictions are sex-discriminatory in application.
They should therefore be abandoned. The sex-neutral policies
proposed above conform with traditional custody principles
while eliminating state-imposed residence restrictions which
cannot be justified on any level other than a sexually discriminatory one. Justice and equality demand no less.
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APPENDIX
RESIDENCE RESTRICTION LITIGATION:
A SAMPLING OF OUTCOMES
CASE
Tanttila v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 446,
382 P.2d 798 (1963).
Nelson v. Card, 162 Colo. 274,425
P.2d 276 (1967).
Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App.
485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972).
In re Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d
344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,.
336 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976).
Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Garland v. Garland, 19 Ill. App. 3d
951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1974).

REASONS ALLEGED
To live "more cheaply," be closer to
relatives, more flexible work
schedule
Remarriage and new husband got
better job
Job opportunity
Relatives, job opportunities, postdivorce tensions
Remarried, new husband's business

Remarried, better job for new
husband, relatives of both
Proposed remarriage and new job
for both
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CASE

REASONS ALLEGED

Tandy v. Tandy, 42 Ill. App. 3d 87,
355 N.E.2d 585 (1976).
Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372
N.E.2d 909 (1978).
Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 Ill. App. 3d
1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980).
In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37
(1980).

Relatives, job, health of mother and
child
New job, detailed arrangements for
child
Better job, better cost of living,
advance arrangements for child
New house, new job, close to
boyfriend though no financial gain

Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, 155
N.W.2d 426 (1968).

Better able to do things for child,
local situation depressing, no
opportunity for advancement
New job, desire to insulate child
from post-divorce tensions
Promotion with substantial increase,
more time with child, extensive
. advance arrangements for child

In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246
N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1976).
In re Marriage of Lower, 269
N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978).
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Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284
N.W.2d 554 (1979).

Gottschall, v. Gottschall, 210 Neb.
679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982).

D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App.
Div. 1976).
Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161
N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202
(App. Div. 1978).
Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J.
Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App.
Div. 1984).
In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 229
N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418
N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862
(1981).
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New job, small increase in salary,
better advancement opportunities
and advance arrangements for
child
Fiance's new job will permit mother
to remain at home with child; he
relates to child well and advance
arrangements made for child
New job, relatives, better housing

DISPOSITION
ON APPEAL
AT TRIAL

Granted

Ex-husband's remarriage soon after
divorce
Search for new job, escape social
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inflation on tight budget
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